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ABSTRACT 
 
 Aviation safety outcomes, such as mishaps, are a product of an aviation 
organization’s safety culture (Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). Safety 
cultures should be assessed in order to improve an organization’s state of safety 
(Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper, Collins, Bernard, Schwann, & Knox, 2019; Wiegmann, 
Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004). Questionnaires are one of the best ways 
of obtaining information about an organization’s safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2004; 
Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Additionally, the extent to which aviation hazards are 
reported (hazreps) serve as an indicator of the health of an aviation Safety Management 
System (SMS) (Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019) and as a marker of a proactive 
safety culture (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). Proactive 
safety cultures are linked to hazard mitigation amongst aviation organizations (Barach, 
2000; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). In light of this, and in an effort to have a proactive 
safety culture, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) wishes to know the extent of the 
relationship between its annual Operational Climate Survey (safety survey) and hazreps. 
The main research question for this thesis is: What is the extent of the relationship 
between USCG aviation safety survey data and the total of aviation hazards reported? 
First, an Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted to determine the validity and 
reliability of the safety survey using data from FY 2015 to FY 2018 (n = 10,622) and to 
reduce the survey data to clusters of items within factors. The survey was found to be 
 xix 
statistically reliable. The averaged survey items within factors represented the survey in 
order to perform a Pearson’s Correlation procedure between the survey data and hazrep 
totals per USCG air station (n = 28) per year. In addition, multiple regression procedures 
were carried out to determine if the safety survey was predictive of the extent to which 
hazards were reported. This research revealed that there was no statistically significant 
correlation between the safety survey and hazreps, and consequently, the safety survey 
was not predictive of hazreps.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
High risk industries such as aviation need to have safety-minded cultures in order 
to mitigate risks and hazards. Key to being safety-minded is the need for safety 
practitioners to assess the state of the organization and take action thereafter (Gu & Itoh, 
2013). With such assessments, markers have been found to give an indication about how 
an organization’s Safety Management System (SMS; defined later) is performing. One 
marker of safety culture performance is the existence and quality of a reporting system 
for accidents or close calls to be reported (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) administers an annual aviation 
questionnaire called the USCG Operational Climate Survey (hereafter referred to as 
“safety survey”). The safety survey is offered to all USCG personnel involved in aviation 
(pilots, rescue swimmers, flight crew, maintainers, and aviation leadership) and assesses 
the safety culture at each of the twenty-eight air stations. Several survey items pertain to 
the five USCG-defined safety cultures (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 
2016). The reporting culture is one of these wherein hazard reporting is key to the success 
of an organization’s safety program. Reporting hazards involves individuals offering 
information pertaining to risks, close calls, or near-misses (USCG Office of Aviation 
Safety (CG-1311), 2016).  
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 An organization’s safety culture may be categorized as proactive or reactive. In 
order to catch hazards prior to their devolution into actual mishaps, there is emphasis on 
organizations to cultivate and sustain a proactive culture (Reason, 2008). Hazard 
reporting is characteristic of proactive safety cultures (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reiman & 
Pietikäinen, 2012). The ability for members in an organization to report hazards and the 
extent to which this is done is linked to the health of an aviation safety culture (Cooper, 
Collins, Bernard, Schwann, & Knox, 2019; Adjekum et al., 2015). Hindsight and analysis 
of historic safety events is important to learn from previous mistakes; this practice also 
enhances a just safety culture, thereby reducing a culture of blame. Proactive safety 
management, however, is important in reducing accident rates by enabling organization 
leaders the ability to instate preventative safety measures preemptive to mishap 
occurrences (Barach, 2000). 
Safety survey results are presently not used as a predictive tool at the USCG 
headquarters or air station levels. There is potential for the Coast Guard aviation safety 
survey data to act as a predictive tool if properly analyzed. The relationship between the 
safety survey and the extent to which hazards are reported is unknown (A. Carvalhais, C. 
Comperatore (USCG IRB), C. Wright (USCG Safety Programs Chief), A. Young, J. 
Cooley, personal communications, October 4-16, 2017). Determining the extent of this 
relationship is the purpose of this research. 
USCG Safety Survey 
The annual safety survey is “an in-depth audit of all phases of operations 
involving safety” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 20-3). With 
 
 
3 
survey results, air station leaders can obtain information about safety practices and safety 
culture. The safety survey provides air station members the opportunity to anonymously 
communicate safety issues (USCG, 2016). In addition to air station benefits, the Office of 
Safety and Environmental Health (CG-113), a USCG Headquarters office, is responsible 
for evaluating air station safety posture, gathering feedback on safety issues, and 
understanding the efficacy of safety training programs and policy (USCG Office of 
Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016).  
Analyzing survey data is advantageous to the assessment of safety cultures 
because survey respondents are free to provide opinions on their own perceptions of the 
organization’s culture (Wreathall, 1995). Safety surveys provide leaders with a valuable 
tool to assess the likelihood that aircraft and lives may be lost. Therefore, leaders should 
treat survey results with thoughtful consideration in determining organizational safety 
policies and practices (Schimpf, 2004). 
Hazard Reporting and the Health of SMS 
 The extent to which hazards are reported (hereafter referred to as hazreps) serve 
as a proactive marker of safety performance (Adjekum, et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019; 
Gu & Itoh, 2013). Individuals’ knowledge of the reporting options, along with how to use 
each option is crucial to the health of the reporting culture (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  
 For this research, hazreps are drawn from USCG Class D mishaps. Class D 
mishaps are defined by the severity of injuries, cost, damage, as well as a sub-set of other 
events defined by USCG policy. Within this sub-set, there is a list of events that “reveal 
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hazardous trends and underscore lessons learned…” and “must be reported to prevent 
recurrence of similar events that could result in much greater injury or damage” (USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 3-4). This list includes: “Any events that 
identify possible deficiencies in current operational policy or procedures; [issues with] 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); or [airframe] configuration or performance” 
(USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 3-5). Additionally, there is a more 
specific list of aviation-related hazards that should be reported. These hazards are (USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, pp. 3-5, 3-6): 
1. Aeromedical events 
2. Precautionary landings 
3. Power loss 
4. Propeller wash 
5. Rotor wash 
6. Engine wash 
7. Weather-related mishaps 
8. Jettison 
9. Hoist shear 
10. Equipment drops 
11. Things falling off aircraft 
12. Laser exposure 
13. Near midair collisions 
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Some hazards are subtle and require initiative on the behalf of aircrewmen and 
maintainers to report. Examples of such subtle hazards are (USCG Office of Aviation 
Safety (CG-1311), 2016, pp. 3-5, 3-6): 
1. Unsafe work conditions 
2. Resource gaps such as insufficient tools  
3. Rogue aviators 
4. Breakdowns in Crew Resource Management.  
These hazards should be reported as they provide free lessons for USCG aviation 
at large (USCG, 2016). It is with hazreps such as these that change in organizational 
procedures are initiated (von Thaden, T. & Gibbons, A., 2008).  
Coast Guard Air Stations 
U.S. Coast Guard air stations range from 100 to 600 members. Air stations are 
throughout the country along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, along the shores of the Gulf 
Mexico and the Great Lakes, in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Air stations conduct 
varying missions that include homeland security protection, search and rescue, drug and 
migrant interdiction, and fisheries enforcement (USCG Office of Aviation Forces (CG-
711), 2013).  
The Relevance of this Research 
Based on conversations with the Chief of Safety Programs (CG-113) and the U.S. 
Coast Guard Institutional Review Board, the relationship between the safety survey and 
the extent to which hazards are reported is presently unknown. This research investigated 
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if there is any relationship between the safety survey and hazreps, if there is a correlation, 
or if the safety survey predicts hazreps (A. Carvalhais, C. Comperatore (USCG IRB), C. 
Wright (Safety Programs Chief), A. Young, J. Cooley, personal communications, 
October 4-16, 2017).  
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are structures that enable the development of 
policies and systems to promote and assess safety practices within organizations (Stolzer 
& Goglia, 2015). Since hazreps are a proactive marker for the health of an SMS, it is 
beneficial to the U.S. Coast Guard to determine the extent of the relationship between the 
safety survey and hazreps (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, January 2, 
2018). If there is a relationship, the safety survey can serve as an efficient means of 
determining the health of air station SMS’s before hazards manifest into actual mishaps. 
This research is beneficial regardless of the outcome of the analysis. Results will be 
informative to USCG leaders whether there is a relationship revealed between variables 
or not.  
There is a gap in research on this topic throughout the aviation industry. There 
exists a breadth of literature covering SMS assessment, including surveys and 
questionnaires, as well as numerous books and articles covering the reporting culture and 
its importance. However, there is a dearth of literature specifically assessing the 
relationships between questionnaires and hazard reporting. This research study will 
attempt to address this research gap in the aviation industry, while targeting a specific 
U.S. Coast Guard need.  
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between the USCG 
aviation safety survey and the extent to which hazards are reported. Additionally, this 
study will add to the body of research pertaining to the interaction between safety culture 
and hazard reporting. 
Problem Statement 
This study is intended to bolster the field of aviation safety culture research as 
well as meet the needs of the USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131). In the broadest 
sense, the purpose of this study is to improve USCG aviation pillars of safety. These 
pillars are Aviation Safety Policy, Risk Management, Assurance, and Promotion (USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). This research focuses on the Safety 
Promotion pillar, specifically the safety and reporting cultures (USCG, 2015).  
Reporting safety concerns come in different forms. Specifically, reporting hazards 
is an indicator of a positive SMS as a whole (Harris, 2016). The safety culture affects an 
organization’s state of safety, which ultimately affects safety outcomes such as mishap 
occurrences and avoidance (Reason, 2008). 
 This research seeks to determine the extent of the relationship between the annual 
safety survey and hazard reporting. This knowledge will inform leaders at the air station 
level as well as fleetwide throughout the U.S. Coast Guard.  
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Literature Review 
Hazard Reporting and its Effect on Proactive Safety Cultures  
Reason (2008) has written about collective mindfulness, a state in which 
organizations are poised to optimally respond to mishaps. Organizations who have 
collective mindfulness attempt to learn from hazard reports in an effort to thwart larger 
scale hazards from turning into actual mishaps. Such organizations encourage the 
reporting culture by rewarding those people who make reports, especially reports 
pertaining to one’s own mistakes or near misses. The importance of this reward schema is 
rooted in the premise that smaller incidents are relics of larger, potentially more 
hazardous, issues within the organization (Reason, 2008). Looking beyond the people 
who were proximal to a mishap, but instead, analyzing organizational influences that 
were antecedents to mishaps, paints a more complete picture of an organization’s safety 
culture (Dekker, 2002).  
 Hazard reports are free lessons that provide insight into errors that may possess 
catastrophic potential. Identifying the right lessons from past events can be applied 
proactively, thereby reducing the quantity and severity of future mishaps. Organization 
members will only communicate hazards, however, if they feel it is safe to do so without 
fear of reciprocating punishment (Gu & Itoh, 2013; McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018; 
Reason, 2008).  
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The extent to which hazards are reported is integral to the success of an 
organization’s safety management (McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018). Failed safety 
cultures are strongly connected to organizational accidents (Robertson, 2018). Hazards 
are reduced as much as practicable when organizations have strong safety cultures and 
advanced Safety Management Systems (Wang, 2011).  
 For an organization to proactively impose safety-related policy changes, leaders 
need to rely on those free lessons that arrive in the wake of near misses. While major 
mishaps may be denser with learned-lessons, they are too infrequent to use for regular, 
nimble, organizational change. Therefore, proactive organizations attempt to forecast 
major events by identifying hazardous factors, which in turn, aid in preventing these 
hazards from materializing into mishaps (Reason, 2008). Analyzing such leading 
indicators can increase organizational defenses against serious mishap potential in the 
future. Insight into which hazards culminate into larger mishaps can assist leaders in 
making decisions that steer the organization away from mishaps yet also continue to 
bolster those defenses that have previously been effective (Van der Schraaf, Lucas, & 
Hale, 1991). Reviewing historical data, such as hazreps, is a beneficial way to gain 
insights into a safety culture (Wreathall, 1995). 
USCG Safety Survey 
High-risk organizations’ (such as a USCG air station) safety cultures need to be 
regularly assessed in order to improve upon (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & 
Gibbons, 2004). Case studies, surveys, field observations, interviews, and focus group 
discussions, in particular, provide safety leadership with a snapshot of the safety culture 
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(Patankar & Sabin, 2010). Such assessments reveal performance indicators of the 
organization’s SMS (Cooper et al., 2019). If safety practitioners intend to understand the 
state of an organization’s safety culture, questionnaires and surveys are one of the best 
means to do so (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Surveys are one of the best ways to gain 
perspective into people’s opinions and beliefs (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018).  
The USCG annual safety survey is designed to identify and measure trends from 
one year to the next. Air station leaders glean safety-related information from the people 
who operate and maintain the air station’s aircraft. Survey results provide leaders 
information relating to safety practices and the five USCG-defined safety sub-cultures 
(later defined). In taking the survey, respondents are provided an anonymous means to 
communicate safety issues such as mission scheduling practices, maintenance, leadership 
impact, morale, and resource (USCG, 2016). 
Survey items cover the U.S. Coast Guard’s five sub safety cultures as well as 
hazard potential, adequacy of training, proficiency, standardization, effectiveness of 
quality control, adequacy of resources, and physiological and psychological safety 
aspects (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016).  
USCG safety survey efficacy. A survey has existed in the USCG since the 
1990’s. It has changed form since then, but the exact dates of the current survey are 
unknown (A. Carvalhais, personal communication, November 28, 2018). There is 
conflicting information about the survey’s tests of validity and reliability. It is unknown if 
either the survey was never validated and tested for reliability or was once tested but 
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those results are located in an unknown location by USCG aviation safety officials (R. 
Figlock, personal communication, April 11, 2018, A. Carvalhais, personal 
communication, November 16, 2017). Because of this unknown, this research sets out to 
test validity and reliability. 
Survey Validity and Reliability 
Conducting a factor analysis helps determine survey validity, survey reliability, 
and reveals the structure of latent variables (Field, 2018). Survey validity is necessary to 
determine if an instrument is measuring what it sets out to measure (Rocco, 2011). 
Content validity ensures that survey items properly represent the desired dimension 
(Field, 2018). There is empirical grounding in using exploratory factor analyses to 
validate surveys relating to safety cultures (Adjekum, 2017; Edwards, Knight, Broome, & 
Flynn, 2010; Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006; Vinodkumara & Bhasib, 2010). 
Survey reliability is an additional requirement in survey design which confirms 
the survey’s ability to consistently measure the desired constructs and confirms if every 
time the instrument is used, similar results can be expected (Rocco, 2011). The 
Cronbach’s alpha is a common measure of survey reliability (Field, 2018). 
Safety Culture Definition 
Human error can be viewed as the source of many accidents and mishaps, so it is 
worth inspecting the precursors of human error and see what is causal in the chain of 
events leading up to an accident (Dekker, 2002). While it is important to investigate why 
an error occurred, it is just as, if not more fruitful, to uncover other contributing factors 
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that led up to the actual error or mishap. Embedded in this chain of events is safety 
culture (Dekker, 2002).  
A culture sets the overall tone in an organization and can affect many aspects of 
work environments, including safety. Cultures are comprised of those shared rituals, 
goals, beliefs, and values of an organization and its members (Wiegmann et al., 2004). 
These values and beliefs are held by members at all levels of an organization and affect 
safety behaviors (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010).  
Safety culture can be described through its characteristics. A healthy safety 
culture has features that enhance knowledge transfer, improve knowledge of risk 
management, and have a means of receiving and providing feedback (Pidgeon, 1991). 
Healthy safety cultures characteristically foster inclusion of all organizational members, 
buy-in from safety leaders, and perpetuate safety promotion (Palframan, 1994). Healthy 
safety cultures are free of blame (Palframan, 1994), augment safety motivation, are a 
means of communicating safety information (Reason, 1997), encourage reporting and 
learning safety information, and stand the test of time (Wiegmann, et al., 2004).  
Safety culture importance and influence. Organizational culture is the 
foundation of safe operations (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015) and is tightly connected to 
operational safety (Wiegmann et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the extent of mishap occurrences 
is strongly linked with failed safety cultures (Robertson, 2018). Within positive safety 
cultures, not only are mishap occurrences kept at bay, but all the components of aviation 
Safety Management Systems perform seamlessly (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Policies and 
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organizational cultures reside within SMSs (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). Additionally, SMS 
implementation, management commitment, and safety promotion all influence safety 
cultures (Robertson, 2018). 
USCG Safety Culture Sub-Components 
  The Safety and Environmental Health Manual is the primary guidance on all 
matters relating to USCG safety. This manual classifies and categorizes mishaps, 
describes hazard reporting, provides policy on the annual aviation safety survey, and 
defines the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety cultures (USCG, 2016). These safety cultures are 
the sub-components that comprise the greater safety culture and are summarized as 
follows (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016): 
1. Informed cultures have leaders who are knowledgeable about issues that affect 
organizational safety. 
2. Flexible cultures adapt with new hazards or changes in operational pace. 
3. Learning cultures are comprised of key members analyzing safety data and 
drawing conclusions in order to take further action. 
4. Just cultures have members who trust their leaders to maintain accountability for 
unacceptable behavior and to learn from acceptable behavior. In turn, the 
organization’s members offer safety information without fear of reprisal. 
5. Reporting cultures make it possible to report mistakes and hazards and further, are 
encouraged to do so. 
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Interaction of the Safety Culture Sub-Components 
 These sub-components interact with each other. Research conducted by Gerede 
(2015), in a Turkish aircraft maintenance organization, illustrated the extent to which 
safety culture sub-components were symbiotic. Reducing Gerede’s (2015) findings on 
this topic to one statement: an organization cannot have one successful safety culture sub-
component without the rest. Gerede (2015) wrote, “Unsuccessful reporting is likely to 
hamper hazard and risk analysis, risk mitigation measures, understanding the effects of 
mitigation, measurement of safety performance, monitoring safety over time, finding the 
root causes of factors that compromise safety, predicting the future and thus, taking 
measures for and management of change” (p. 235). This quote elucidates how all the 
safety culture components may degrade or augment each other. 
The state of the just culture affects employees’ willingness to speak up which 
affect the quality and quantity of safety information inputs (reporting culture) which is 
needed in order to enrich the learning culture (Gerede, 2015). A relic of a healthy safety 
culture is witnessed by the extent to which organization members report and learn from 
mistakes (Wiegmann et al., 2004). 
Interaction of Just and Reporting Cultures. Removing blame from errors and 
mishaps will result in an enhancement of an organization’s just culture. Just cultures 
promote the reporting of adverse events, mistakes, and hazards, which, in turn promotes 
the learning safety culture (Cooper et al., 2019; McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018). Just 
cultures encapsulate reporting cultures. Edwards (2018) further emphasizes this point in a 
description of failed just cultures in U.S. hospitals. In the hospitals researched, blame and 
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hostility were normalized; doctors’ and nurses’ careers were jeopardized if they were to 
report their own mistakes. In such a climate, safety culture progress is blunted (Edwards, 
2018).  
Another example of the detrimental effects of unjust cultures may be found in 
Liao’s (2015) research on pilots employed with a major Chinese airline. This research 
exposed the negative impacts on reporting cultures due to pilot hierarchical power 
differentials coupled with pilots’ intrinsic desires to maintain harmony within the cockpit. 
This unjust culture created a barrier to the communication of safety-related data and 
therefore inhibited the extent to which voluntary reports were made (Liao, 2015). 
Trust encourages the voluntary communication of safety information and is 
therefore requisite for just cultures to exist (Reason, 1997). The issue of voluntary or self-
motivated reporting safety issues has gained prominence due to the implications on 
aviation safety management systems. In recent research, “fear of reprisal” was the leading 
reason why Australian commercial pilots did not provide voluntary safety reports 
(McMurtrie & Molesworth, 2018).  
The Global Aviation Information Network provides guidance on creating and 
sustaining a reporting culture that is just with the following characteristics (2004, p. 292): 
• Ease of making a safety report. 
• Professional handling of investigations. 
• Rapid feedback to the reporting community. 
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• Separation of the department collecting and analyzing safety reports from that 
with the authority to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions. 
• Independence of the managers from the reporting system. 
• Clear procedures for determining culpability and follow-up action.  
Hazard Reporting and the Reporting Culture 
In an effort to be proactive in mishap reduction, aviation organizations should 
measure what leading indicators that are available. One such leading indicator is the 
extent to which organization members are able to report hazards (Reiman & Pietikäinen, 
2012). Such hazard reports provide leadership a means of knowing the health of their 
organization’s safety culture and risks the organization faces. This is a proactive posture 
for leaders to assume. In being proactive, leaders can detect and trap errors before they 
surface as mishaps; however, members of the organization need practical skills necessary 
to stay vigilant and discover hazards. In turn, there needs to be clear knowledge on how 
to communicate hazards to leadership (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008). 
Reason (2008) and Schein (2004) explain how leadership’s commitment to safety 
is embodied by their reaction when safety-related information and hazards are reported. It 
is critical that leaders treat safety reports as vital components of an SMS, and not pursue 
any disciplinary action (Reason, 2008).   
In order to find trends to make policy changes and operational decisions, hazards 
need to get in the hands of leaders and safety officers (ICAO, 2013). Since catastrophic 
aviation accidents are relatively infrequent, there is a resultant void in accessible data for 
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organizations to use in order to be flexible in creating change necessary to enhance an 
aviation organization’s safety. Meanwhile, near misses and hazards occur far more 
frequently and therefore, produce many more lessons worth informing aviation leaders 
about (Reason, 2008). Once hazards are communicated, safety personnel can take a 
proactive safety stance and attempt to be predictive with decisions thereafter (ICAO, 
2013).  
Major mishaps are comprised of those numerous, incremental risks that are 
realized in day-to-day hazards. Having an understanding of such near misses and hazards 
provide leadership with the ingredients that culminate and result in these infrequent major 
accidents. Knowing these ingredients provide leaders an opportunity to preemptively 
inject measures to reduce risk and mishap rates (Van der Schraaf et al., 1991).  
 Reactive safety postures, on the other hand, are more problematic than the mere 
tardiness of an aviation organization’s mishap response. By having a reactive posture, 
safety personnel are influenced by their present-time retrospection. Despite safety 
analyzers best efforts, it is impossible to fully comprehend the real-time events when 
looking back to a later time. In this scenario, the best that safety personnel can do is 
respond with as much contextual understanding as practicable (Dekker, 2014).  
USCG Hazard Reporting 
 There should be numerous systems in place for organization members to 
anonymously report hazards (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). In the U.S. Coast Guard, hazards 
may be submitted via a hyperlink on the daily flight schedule (online via the USCG 
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intranet), communicated verbally, or anonymously written down on paper and placed in 
locked boxes throughout the air station (USCG, 2016).  
USCG guidance provides a description of what an ideal reporting culture looks like. 
In this ideal, there are numerous methods of communicating hazards; all air station 
members know what the reporting requirements are; hazard reports occur automatically 
without Flight Safety Officer (FSO) probing or initiation; leaders within the chain of 
command add insight to a mishap report as it gets routed for approval; and safety 
information is communicated with punctuality and timeliness (USCG, 2016). 
The U.S. Coast Guard provides the following guidance to FSOs in cultivating hazard 
reporting (USCG, 2016, p. 42): 
• Are there “Anymouse” boxes [similar to a suggestion box] throughout the base?  
• Is there an anonymous reporting link on your air station's flight schedule?  
• Does everyone know about these reporting boxes and link?  
• Mention the importance of reporting in your closing remarks to every one of the 
numerous safety presentations you give.  
• Is the safety office in a strategic location? Does everyone know where the FSO 
works?  
• Ensure Aviation Engineering leadership buy-in. 
• View the blue and pink sheets [mission flight log and aircraft discrepancy log, 
respectively] on the previous day's schedule to catch any mishaps. If there were 
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and you didn't hear about it, use this as an opportunity to educate aircrew on 
reporting and take further action to bolster your unit's reporting culture.  
 USCG reporting policy. The U.S. Coast Guard promulgated policy on the 
reporting culture. First, there is a requirement to have a means of anonymously reporting 
hazards. Anonymous reporting boxes must be located such that people may drop paper-
based reports and retain as much privacy and discretion as practicable. There should also 
be a means of providing prompt feedback to show how the hazard was addressed or at a 
minimum, acknowledged. All the while, leadership should emphasize their focus on 
safety targets rather than seeking reprisal on those whom place hazard reports (USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). USCG policy underscores the importance of 
hazard reporting within an SMS by stating, “The command must establish a clear safety 
message and achievable goals to create a positive command climate. These actions begin 
with the free flow of safety information and hazard reporting at all levels of the unit, and 
recognition for commitment to safety awareness and mishap prevention” (USCG Office 
of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 1-5). 
Research Questions 
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey 
data and the total of aviation hazards reported? 
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard? 
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety 
culture?  
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting? 
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a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting? 
4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential 
inhibiting limitations? 
5. How can the safety survey be improved? 
Hypotheses 
H1: USCG safety survey items that relate to safety culture all load onto one EFA factor. 
H2: The safety survey is reliable. 
H3: The safety survey correlates with hazreps. 
H4: The safety survey predicts hazreps. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s aviation safety survey and the extent to which aviation hazards are reported. This 
study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey 
data and the total of aviation hazards reported? 
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard? 
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety 
culture?  
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting? 
a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting? 
4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential 
inhibiting limitations? 
5. How can the safety survey be improved? 
Research Design 
This research study used a quantitative sampling of data from October 1, 2014 to 
September 30, 2018 (Fiscal Year (FY)15 to FY18). The data came from two sources: the 
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annual safety survey and the total number of hazard reports per air station per year. All 
statistical procedures were completed using IBM SPSS Statistics software, version 24. 
Figure 1 summarizes this research design and may be referenced to supplement the 
methodology explanation that follows. 
 
Figure 1. Research Design Summary.  
Safety Survey  
Survey responses were drawn from the entire U.S. Coast Guard for four years 
(FY15 – FY18). Surveys were taken by individuals whom, at the time of the survey, were 
stationed at one of the Coast Guard’s air stations.  
The U.S. Coast Guard uses an online service called Verint® to administer the 
survey. The survey data was saved within Verint®’s servers (USCG, 2016). The USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131) shared these data for the purpose of this research. 
This research required access to all survey results for FY15 – FY18. Appendix A 
contains the list of survey items.  
At the survey’s inception, the USCG conceived an 8-point Likert-style scale for 
most survey items. These response options are listed in Table 1.   
Safety Survey
Independent Variable
• EFA
• Factors
• Reliability
• Averaged Survey 
Factors
HAZREPS
Outcome Variable
• Total Class Ds per air 
station per year. 
• < 500 dollars
• 0 injuries
Survey & HAZREP 
Relationship
• Correlation
• Multiple Regression
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Table 1. USCG Safety Survey Likert-Style Response Options 
Selectable Response Meaning 
0 Not answerd 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neutral 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly 
disagree 
6 Don’t know 
7 N/A 
 
The remaining survey items were multiple choice as well as open-ended. For the purpose 
of this research, these survey items were not used.  
The survey also branched, allowing particular demographics to answer a bank of 
survey items, and disabling such items to other demographics. For example, some survey 
items were intended for pilots only, while others were only intended for aviation 
mechanics (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018).  
The survey had not previously been statistically validated or tested for reliability 
(R. Figlock, personal communication, April 11, 2018, A. Carvalhais, personal 
communication, November 16, 2017). 
Participants. Participants in this study were drawn from a population of all ranks 
found at air stations throughout the USCG. The population of safety survey respondents 
were comprised of USCG pilots, maintenance personnel, and enlisted flight crew (rescue 
swimmers, navigators, sensor operators, etc.). Demographics were captured in the survey 
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including rank, current job, which USCG asset the respondent was assigned to (model of 
aircraft), how long the respondent had been assigned to the current unit (air station), and 
recency of last deployment (USCG, 2016). 
A purposive sampling strategy was used to elicit responses to the survey which 
was sent out via the internet. Participation in the survey was voluntary and Table 2 
presents the number of survey respondents per fiscal year.  
Table 2. Number of Survey Participants Per Fiscal Year. 
Fiscal Year n 
FY15 2,726 
FY16 2,994 
FY17 3,098 
FY18 3,368 
 
Likert-style scale and missing data. This particular Likert-style scale would 
pose problems for the EFA if left unattended. First, 0 = not answered, is a selectable item 
on the survey, but survey respondents could simply not answer the survey item, which 
would result in missing data. Missing data was excluded pairwise, merely not using data 
that was not existant. Since the survey data had such a large respondent number, ranging 
from n = 10,622 to n = 2,307 (based on branching logic), it is statistically acceptable to 
exclude pairwise cases. As such, excluding missing data by excluding the entire 
respondent’s survey items, or by replacing the missing data with the mean, were 
unnecessary (Field, 2018).  
Likert scale responses of 0, 6, and 7 were excluded from the Exploratory Factor 
Analysis because these answers would negatively impact the statistical procedure. By 
excluding 0 = “not answered,” this was statistically the same as excluding pairwise cases 
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for missing data. If respondents selected 6 or 7 (“Don’t know” and “N/A,” respectively), 
the mean for that survey item would erroneously increase, trending toward “strongly 
disagree.” Therefore, survey responses of 0, 6, and 7 were recoded to not factor into the 
EFA. 
 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
An Exploratory Factor Analysis evaluates clusters of underlying constructs and 
may also suggest a reduction in the number of items in a survey (Field, 2018). This EFA 
used Principle Axis Factoring (PAF). Oblimin and varimax rotations were both initially 
performed for preliminary analysis. The oblimin was selected as the preferred rotation 
method because there were fewer cross-correlations between survey items than the 
varimax rotation. Sampling adequacy was evaluated using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) test. Lastly, a reliability analysis evaluated the consistency of the survey scale 
items using the Cronbach’s alpha. 
To determine survey validity, survey items were clustered into latent variables. 
These variables’ correlations were assessed, survey items that had low goodness of fit 
values were removed, and the survey was subsequently re-analyzed. In factor analysis, 
the process of extracting survey items may improve the survey’s validity and reliability 
(Field, 2018). PAF analysis was performed in order to obtain eigenvalues for each factor. 
The following items were analyzed using Field (2018)’s guidance:  
1. The Scree plot along with the total variances’ eigenvalues to determine factor-
retention based on the plot’s point of inflexion in combination with factor 
loadings. 
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2. The Determinant, an indication of multicollinearity. In general, if the Determinant 
is less than 0.00001, there may be a problem with multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity is when multiple variables are too closely related. If 
multicollinearity exists, it may not be possible to determine the unique 
contribution of a variable to a factor. 
3. The KMO value measures how suited data is for a factor analysis. The KMO 
should be greater than 0.5. The closer the KMO value is to 1, the more closely 
compact variables’ patterns of correlations are, which indicates reliable, and 
distinct, factors from the factor analysis (Kaiser & Rice, 1974).  
4. The Bartlett’s test informs that correlations between variables are significantly 
different from zero.  
5. The Pearson’s correlation coefficients to confirm values between .3 and .9. 
Coefficients that are less than .3 are likely a poor fit between an item and the rest 
of the pool of items. Greater than .9, the items are representative of the whole 
scale. 
Factors. Factors are those underlying dimensions that emerge from an EFA and 
are comprised of correlated survey items. An EFA provides a covariance matrix structure 
to ensure that items that are highly correlated cluster under a specific factor (Field, 2018). 
Factors with eigenvalues less than one were excluded from subsequent analysis. Factors 
were then treated as their own new variables for the correlation and multiple regression 
analysis discussed later. 
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Hazreps 
In order to determine hazrep totals, Class D mishaps were categorized by 
summing the mishaps that cost less than 500 dollars and sustained zero injuries. These 
were totaled per air station per year. It was determined by the USCG’s Office of Aviation 
Safety (CG-1131) that mishaps costing less than 500 dollars may be considered a hazrep 
for the purpose of this research. The rationale for this decision was that, since aircraft 
parts and maintenance labor hours are costly, most mishaps that cost 500 dollars or less 
were actually mere hazards that had collateral, residual cost (C. Wright, J. Cooley, 
personal communications, January 2, 2018). This point is illustrated in the following 
example of an aircraft conducting a precautionary landing due to a suspected issue. After 
landing, a maintenance inspection was performed which uncovered no aircraft issues. 
Due to the maintenance that was performed, there would still be maintenance labor hours 
(at a cost) associated with the inspection. This event may, however, still have a “free 
lesson” and therefore get reported as a Class D mishap, which the Office of Aviation 
Safety considers a hazard report (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, 
January 2, 2018).  
Correlation and Regression Between the Safety Survey and Hazreps 
A correlation was performed in order to determine the extent of the relationship 
between the safety survey and hazreps. Correlation is a statistical procedure that 
determines if variables are related positively or negatively, if at all (Field, 2018). A 
Pearson’s correlation procedure was used for this research.  
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In order to establish if the safety survey variables predict hazrep variables, a linear 
regression procedure was performed at the air station level (as opposed to the individual 
survey respondent level). Using the equation for a line, y = mx + b, given any x, 
regression is used to predict y (Field, 2018). In the context of this research, hazreps were 
y, and the safety survey was x.  
Data Collection   
Survey data preparation. The survey responses were downloaded from Verint® 
into .sav files, the IBM SPSS Statistics software file format. The data was stored on a 
USCG-approved external hard drive (Imation Defender H200 + Bio 320GB) which 
requires a fingerprint to unlock. These data were then combined into one file in order to 
perform the Exploratory Factor Analysis. 
Anonymity was assured through the use of the Verint® web-based questionnaire 
system which assigns an 18-digit identifier code to each set of responses. With safety 
survey data open in IBM SPSS Statistics software, the first column was deleted. This 
column contained all respondent 18-digit identifier codes. Working from the 
aforementioned hard drive with the identifier code deleted, respondents were 
disassociated with their responses from the files used for this research. 
There were no survey items with reverse-phrasing. Therefore, there was no need 
to reverse-score the survey response data for any items. 
Hazreps. There are multiple ways in which members of U.S. Coast Guard air 
stations may communicate a concern, a near-miss, or close call. Depending on criteria 
defined by USCG policy, however, hazreps may be published to the entire Coast Guard 
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via the official mishap reporting system. This reporting system is called e-Aviatrs (USCG 
Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016). For the purposes of this research, hazreps 
will be exclusively drawn from e-Aviatrs because it is the only means by which USCG 
hazreps are documented and stored and therefore, the only means by which hazrep data 
may be extracted (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, January 2, 2018).  
USCG Class D mishaps were downloaded at the air station level for the same four 
years as the survey data (FY15 to FY18). This provided the total number of Class D 
mishaps per air station per year, which was needed to compare air station safety surveys 
with hazreps per year. Hazard reports were then parsed out of Class D mishaps.  
After noting those Class D mishaps that were categorized as hazreps, these 
hazreps were then summed for each air station by fiscal year. The hazrep total then 
became the outcome variable for this research. 
Data issue. An issue that might have impacted results is the unknown lag effect 
between any changes in safety cultural and resultant safety behavior. In other words, the 
safety survey may capture a safety culture that yields some result in hazrep totals, but it is 
unknown when those effects on hazrep totals would be realized. In the context of this 
research design, safety survey results and hazreps were analyzed within the same fiscal 
year. If there was a misalignment with an air station’s safety survey and hazrep totals, the 
statistical analysis would be skewed.  
Averaged Constructs to Represent the Safety Survey for Correlation/Regression 
Each construct that emerged from the factor analysis became its own new 
variable. All survey item responses per factor for each air station, for each fiscal year, 
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were summed, then divided by the number of answered survey items. This produced the 
average response value per factor per air station per year. To put in other words, all the 
responses for the survey items that comprised each PAF factor were averaged for each 
year at each air station. This resulted in new variables that were then used to conduct 
correlation and multiple regression procedures. This process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Design Process. 
 
 
Survey EFA
•PAF
•Reliability - Cronbach’s 
alpha
•Reduce Survey data to 
AIRSTA level
EFA Factors 
•Averaged Survey 
Factors
Correlation & 
Multiple Regression
•Survey factors & 
Hazrep total 
Independent 
Variable: Safety 
Survey
EFA Factors
n = 28 air 
stations
4 years
Outcome 
Variable: Hazreps
Total Hazreps 
per air station 
per year
n = 28 air 
stations
4 years
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Correlation and Multiple Regression 
In order to determine if the new independent variables (averaged survey factors) 
were significantly correlated with, or predictive of, the dependent variable (hazreps per 
air station per year), a multiple regression with forced entry procedures was performed. A 
correlation table is simultaneously produced as part of the multiple regression procedure 
in IBM SPSS Statistics software. Assumptions of independent errors, homoscedasticity, 
and linearity were tested by producing a plot of standard residuals. Missing data was 
excluded listwise. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
 University of North Dakota IRB approval was achieved on November 8, 2019. 
The IRB Project Number is IRB-201811-097. Since no human subjects were studied for 
this research, a UND IRB Existing Data Exempt Form was completed. U.S. Coast Guard 
IRB approval was also required and approved on November 28, 2018. Both IRB approval 
letters are included in Appendix B. Individual IRB training was completed on August 24, 
2018.  
Timeline 
 This topic was conceived jointly between the USCG Office of Safety and 
Environmental Health (CG-113) and the USCG IRB on October 4 and 5, 2017. Data was 
downloaded between June and October 2018. Expected graduation date is May 11, 2019.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
To summarize all the data analyses for this thesis, an exploratory factor analysis 
of the U.S. Coast Guard’s aviation safety survey was performed using principle axis 
factoring (PAF); then, the reliability of the survey was verified; using the resultant factors 
from the survey’s factor analysis, statistical procedures were followed to determine if the 
survey was correlated with, or had a predictive relationship to, the extent to which 
hazards were reported. This chapter will describe the results for the PAF, survey 
reliability, correlation procedures, and the multiple regression. 
PAF Results 
 All KMO values in this analysis were above 0.5 except those individual KMO 
values noted below. Also, all Bartlett’s test values were highly significant, p < .0001. 
Rationale for Two PAF/Reliability Iterations 
Two PAF and reliability iterations will be discussed in this section. Through the 
process of analyzing the PAF, each iteration resulted in different values for the analysis 
criteria listed in Chapter II (Methodology). As such, subsequent PAF iterations were 
performed until the analysis was complete. This, however, resulted in a substantial 
number of extracted survey items throughout the PAF process.  
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The first iteration resulted in factor loadings with two (out of 52) survey items 
extracted. The final iteration was performed, after adherence to statistical procedures and 
PAF analysis criteria set forth by Field (2018), resulting in 32 survey items being 
extracted. Since following these procedures to completion resulted in a survey with 
merely 20 of the original 52 items, the first and the final PAF iterations will be discussed 
to provide a before-and-after comparison of survey validity and reliability results. Also, 
these two PAF iterations were used to perform correlation and multiple regression 
procedures with the hazrep outcome variable, resulting in two analyses. 
In total, there were four iterations of PAF, incrementally eliminating items 
(detailed below). For each iteration of PAF, only the significant findings that resulted in 
item-extraction are noted. 
First PAF Iteration – Close Factor Loading Between Two Items 
 After the first PAF iteration, two survey items had factor loadings that were too 
similar. These items, Q6R and Q7R, were subsequently extracted and not used in the first 
reliability analysis which resulted in seven factors. Appendix A shows the factor loadings 
after rotation, including eigenvalues and percent of variance per factor. Due to survey 
branching logic, descriptive statistics varied. The first PAF iteration descriptive statistics 
can be found in Appendix C.  
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Table 3. First PAF Summary.  
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eigenvalues 21.54 2.13 1.79 1.35 1.21 1.08 1.01 
Percent of Variance 42.23 4.18 3.50 2.65 2.37 2.11 1.97 
Item Quantity 7 6 6 3 11 9 4 
D .86 .80 .89 .80 .92 .89 .66 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Figure 3. First PAF Scree Plot. 
 Factors 1, 3, 5, and 6 had a good factor structure because these factors had at least 
five items with factor loadings greater than 0.4 (Field, 2018). These factors represent 
flight skills & standardization evaluations, crew rest/workday, leadership & safety, and 
unit safety adoption. These factors explained the total variance by 42.1 percent, 3.44 
percent, 2.34 percent, and 2.05 percent respectively.  
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Second PAF Iteration – Small Determinant & Poor Fit from Correlation Matrix 
 After the second PAF iteration, the Determinant was 5.67 X 10-14, which is less 
than 0.00001. Three survey items, Q30R, Q113R, and Q118R all had Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients less than 0.3 and were eliminated from further analysis. 
Third PAF Iteration – Small Determinant & Individual KMO Values Less Than 0.5 
After omitting Q30R, Q113R, and Q118R, the Determinant increased to 1.88X10-
13 but was still less than 0.00001. Verifying the individual KMO statistics, there were 
twenty-nine more items to be eliminated. These eliminated survey items were: Q12R, 
Q14R, Q15R, Q16R, Q17R, Q21R, Q22R, Q25R, Q33R, Q33R-Q39R, Q28R, Q65R-
Q71R, Q73R, Q74R, Q112R, Q114R, and Q129R. 
Fourth and Final PAF Iteration 
After excluding the aforementioned survey items, the Determinant increased to a 
suitable 0.001, the KMO value was 0.953 which was still above 0.5, Bartlett’s test was 
still highly significant (p < .0001) and the individual KMO statistics were all greater than 
0.5. These values signaled the conclusion of the PAF analysis. 
Appendix B shows the factor loadings after rotation. Items that clustered onto the 
same factor suggested that factor 1 represented several topics including training quality, 
FSO perception, Crew Resource Management, standardization, and protective equipment. 
Factor 2 represented resources (time and experience). Factor 3 represented asset 
reliability and satisfaction with protective equipment. All descriptive statistics can be 
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found in Appendix D. Based on the same criteria used in the first PAF iteration, factors 1 
and 2 had a good factor structure while the third factor was weak. Total variances 
explained for factor 1 was 39.49 percent, factor 2 was 6.54 percent, and factor 3 was 5.28 
percent. 
Table 4. Final PAF Summary. 
 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 
Eigenvalue 7.90 1.31 1.06 
Percent of Variance 39.49 6.54 5.28 
Item Quantity 11 5 4 
D .87 .79 .59 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
 
 
Figure 4. Final PAF Scree Plot. 
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First Reliability – All Original Survey Items Except Q6R and Q7R 
The first reliability analysis was conducted using the first PAF iteration. Seven 
factors had initial eigenvalues greater than 1.0. All survey items correlated well with the 
overall scale (Field, 2018). As indicated in Table 3, all seven subscales’ Cronbach’s D 
were less than the requisite 1.0 and greater than .80, except Factor 7, Cronbach’s D = .66.  
Second Reliability – Complete PAF Survey Item Extraction Adherence 
The three subscales from the fourth and final PAF were used for this reliability 
analysis. As indicated in Table 4, all three subscales’ Cronbach’s D’s was less than 1.0. 
Factors 1 (D = .87), along with Factor 2 (D = .79) had high reliability. Factor 3 had a low 
reliability (D = .59).  
The last two survey items found in the list in Appendix B (Q79R & Q78R) had 
common variance. However, if these items were extracted, there would only be two other 
remaining items in factor 3, thereby resulting in no Cronbach’s D (no reliability metric) 
for Factor 3. For these reasons, this was the logical place to conclude the analysis.   
Correlation and Multiple Regression Results 
 Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics used for the correlation and multiple 
regression analyses. There were 110 valid cases of hazrep data per air station per fiscal 
year. The missing data for two hazreps is due to Air Station Los Angeles being closed 
after FY16. A positive skewness is confirmed with the histogram plot (Figure 5) showing 
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a trend of data to the left. There is a slight positive kurtosis, indicating a heavier-than-
normal-tailed distribution.  
Table 5. Hazrep Descriptive Statistics. 
N Valid 110 
Missing 2 
Mean 9.14 
Median 8.00 
Variance 38.357 
Skewness .739 
Std. Error of Skewness .230 
Kurtosis .091 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .457 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 29 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Hazrep Histogram. 
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Correlation Results 
Factors drawn from the first PAF and last PAF were used to represent the safety 
survey at large. Since factors were a reduction in data, they served to represent this 
model’s independent variables. Correlation procedures were performed concurrently with 
the multiple regression procedures. To summarize the correlation results, there was no 
significant correlation between the safety survey and hazreps. 
The correlation matrix was checked for multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is 
indicated by independent variables correlating too highly, based on a threshold of r > .9 
(Field, 2018). With this criterion, there was no multicollinearity amongst the survey 
factors (independent variables).  
There were no independent variables (survey factors) that significantly correlated 
with the outcome variable (hazreps). Table 6 indicates the correlation coefficients and p-
values for the first PAF. The most significant predictor amongst the first PAF analysis 
was Factor1 (r = .151, p = .096).  
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Table 6. Correlations Amongst Safety Survey First PAF Factors 1 to 7 and Hazreps. 
  Factor
1 
Factor
2 
Factor
3 
Factor
4 
Factor
5 
Factor
6 
Factor
7 
Pearson 
Correlation 
HAZREP 0.151 -0.010 -0.033 -0.039 -0.006 -0.064 -0.061 
Factor1 1.000 0.578 0.726 0.629 0.699 0.784 0.614 
Factor2   1.000 0.522 0.650 0.593 0.716 0.552 
Factor3     1.000 0.558 0.639 0.756 0.472 
Factor4       1.000 0.822 0.658 0.719 
Factor5         1.000 0.712 0.724 
Factor6           1.000 0.570 
Factor7             1.000 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
HAZREP 0.096 0.466 0.390 0.370 0.481 0.290 0.299 
 
For the last factor analysis iterations (Table 7), StrctFactor3 had the best correlation, 
albeit also non-significant (r = .109, p = .175). 
Table 7. Correlations Amongst Safety Survey Fourth PAF Factors 1 to 3 and Hazreps. 
  HAZREP StrctFactor1 StrctFactor2 StrctFactor3 
Pearson 
Correlation 
HAZREP 1.000 0.029 -0.083 0.109 
StrctFactor1   1.000 0.527 0.632 
StrctFactor2     1.000 0.788 
StrctFactor3       1.000 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
HAZREP   0.402 0.238 0.175 
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Multiple Regression Results 
 Two iterations of multiple regression were performed; one using the first PAF’s 
factors and the second iteration using the last PAF’s factors.  
In order to determine if the independent variables (survey factors) were predictive 
of the outcome variable (hazreps), a multiple regression was performed using forced 
entry procedures. Data was excluded listwise based on Field’s (2018) recommendation 
(p. 302).  
Assumptions of independent errors, homoscedasticity, and linearity were tested 
using plots of standard residuals (found in Appendix F). Also, probability-probability (P-
P) plots for the residuals can be found in Appendix G. These plots portray the probability 
of a variable with the probability of the distribution and are useful to look for variance 
with skewness. These data were in compliance with all assumptions. 
Factors 1 through 7 (first PAF) regression with hazreps. Factors 1 through 7 
accounted for 14.7 percent of the variation in hazreps. The adjusted R2 provides a value 
to determine how well the regression model generalizes. This model would account for 
approximately 8.8 percent less variance in the outcome if the model were consequent 
from the entire population. The quantity of this value indicates that the cross-validity of 
this model is insufficient (Field, 2018).  
 F-statistics indicate if the multiple regression model has a statistically significant 
improvement on predicting the outcome variable than if there were no independent 
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variables (Field, 2018). Using survey factors 1 through 7, this model is not significantly 
better at predicting the outcome variable than the mean outcome, F (7, 68) = 1.672, p = 
.131.  
Factor 1’s t-statistic was significant, t(68) = 3.20, p < .05, but no other factors 
were significant predictors of hazreps. This indicates that Factor 1 was a significant 
predictor of hazreps. As Factor 1’s values increased, the number of hazreps increased. 
Additionally, all but Factor 1’s 95 percent confidence intervals contained zero. 
Confidence intervals that contain zero indicate that there may be zero (or a positive or 
negative) relationship between independent variables and the outcome variable. In other 
words, it is indeterminable what the magnitude or direction of the relationship is between 
survey factors 2 through 6 and hazreps.   
Factors 1 through 3 (final PAF) regression with hazreps. The final PAF’s 
factors 1 through 3 account for 8.8 percent of the variation in hazreps.  The difference 
between R2 and the adjusted R2 indicates an insufficient cross-validity of this model.  
 Using the final PAF’s survey factors 1 through 3, this model is not significantly 
better at predicting the outcome variable than the mean outcome, F(3, 72) = 2.32, p = 
.082. As was the case with the first PAF’s factors 1 through 7, the F-statistic is not 
significant and therefore, this model also does not improve the ability to predict hazreps 
better than if the model were not used.  
The final PAF’s survey factors 2 and 3 were significant predictors of hazreps, 
t(72) = -2.41, p < .05 and t(72) = 2.42, p < .05, respectively. 
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Factor 1’s 95 percent confidence interval also contained zero making it 
indeterminable what the magnitude or direction of the relationship is between survey 
factors 1 and hazreps.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this research was to answer the research question: What is the 
extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey data and the 
total of aviation hazards reported? Subordinate to this overarching research goal were the 
additional research questions and hypotheses. What follows is a summary of the answers 
to each research question and hypothesis, one-by-one.  
Research Questions 
The primary research question for this thesis:  
What is the extent of the relationship between U.S. Coast Guard aviation safety survey 
data and the total of aviation hazards reported?  
Using this study’s research design, there was no statistically significant 
correlation or predictive measures between the safety survey and hazreps. Based on the 
literature review, a significant relationship may very well exist between the safety survey 
and hazreps if the survey were improved upon and if hazard reporting data were captured 
differently. Recommendations on how the safety survey and hazard reporting may be 
improved, and how that may affect the outcome of this, or similar follow-on studies, are 
discussed later.  
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Next, the subordinate research questions: 
1. How are hazards reported in the U.S. Coast Guard? 
Hazards are reported in numerous ways. In the U.S. Coast Guard, hazards may be 
submitted via a hyperlink on the daily flight schedule (online), communicated verbally, or 
anonymously written down on paper and placed in locked boxes throughout the air 
station (USCG, 2016). While these methods of reporting are in compliance with the body 
of literature’s recommendations, this particular research would have been enhanced if 
hazard reporting were improved from the status quo. Such suggested improvements are 
addressed below research question 4.  
2. How is hazard reporting an indicator of the health of an organization’s safety 
culture?  
This question was also answered within the literature review. The extent to which 
aviation hazards are reported serve as an indicator of the health of an aviation Safety 
Management System (Adjekum et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019) and as a marker of a 
proactive safety culture (Gu & Itoh, 2013; Reason, 2008; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). 
Proactive safety cultures are linked to hazard-mitigation strategies amongst aviation 
organizations (Barach, 2000; Reiman & Pietikäinen, 2012). 
3. How is it possible to determine if safety survey data predicts hazard reporting? 
Figure 6 below is a recap of this study’s methodology to help with this question’s 
lucidity. To summarize the methodology of this body of work, survey data was the 
independent variable and hazreps were the outcome variable. In order to reduce the 
survey into data that was useable for correlation and regression procedures, an 
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exploratory factor analysis was performed which reduced the survey into factors, or 
underlying constructs, which thereafter, represented of the survey as a whole.  
 
 
Figure 6. Research Design Process. 
 
a. Does the safety survey predict hazard reporting? 
The safety survey is not predictive of hazreps, PAF factors 1-7: F(7, 68) = 1.672, p = 
.131; PAF last factors: F (3, 72) = 2.32, p = .082. 
Survey EFA
•PAF
•Reliability - Cronbach’s 
alpha
•Reduce Survey data to 
AIRSTA level
EFA Factors 
•Averaged Survey 
Factors
Correlation & 
Multiple Regression
•Survey factors & 
Hazrep total 
Independent 
Variable: Safety 
Survey
EFA Factors
n = 28 air stations
4 years
Outcome Variable: 
Hazreps
Total Hazreps per air 
station per year
n = 28 air stations
4 years
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4. If the current safety survey does not predict hazreps, what are the potential 
inhibiting limitations? 
In answering this question, two main points of improvement have surfaced; first, 
the safety survey and second, the method and extent to which hazreps are documented. 
These are addressed below. 
USCG Safety Survey Limitations 
After excluding just two items, the initial 52-item survey had validity and 
reliability with mixed results. The first iteration of PAF, factors 1, 3, 5, and 6 had good 
factor structures and high reliability. From this point in the analysis, USCG safety 
officers may consider omitting the rest of the survey items that are not included in these 
factors. However, factor 1, pertaining to flight skills and standardization evaluations, 
account for 42.23 percent of the survey’s total variance. Whereas factor 5’s latent 
variable is associated with safety leadership and safety culture, two seemingly important 
topics, but only account for a mere 2.37 percent total variance explained. Based on this 
paper’s literature review addressing safety culture assessments, it is plausible for a safety 
officer to retain the survey items within factor 5, despite the low variances explained. It 
appears as though survey items are not adequately sensitive to the explanatory construct 
of safety culture as compared to flight skills and standardization evaluation. This point 
suggests a need for rewording and re-validation for content and criterion thereby making 
the survey more sensitive to safety culture. 
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After the final iteration of PAF, the survey resulted in only 20 out of 52 original 
items. Since following all analyses with strict adherence resulted in a survey that only 
partially resembled the originally-designed survey, great scrutiny should be applied to 
what USCG leadership wishes to measure and how that information is attempted to be 
obtained with this survey. For instance, factor 1 implied a good factor structure with high 
reliability, but the survey item topics varied and lacked obvious themes. However, factor 
2, had an obvious theme and resulted in high reliability. With this incongruence, USCG 
leadership may consider rewording these survey items.  
Through each iteration of extracting survey items, the survey’s validity improved 
in terms of multicollinearity, factor loading similarity, item fit, and variable correlations. 
This improvement in the survey’s validity comes at a cost of losing information USCG 
leaders may desire. 
As indicated in Tables 3 and 4, the survey’s reliability is currently high. Through 
item extraction, survey reliability is less discernable given the first factor’s varying 
themes as well as the general scarcity in number of factors.  
These results are important for USCG safety leadership to better understand the 
quality of the safety survey in order to know if it is measuring what is intended. This 
knowledge will assist leaders in sustaining a robust safety culture assessment protocol. 
Ultimately, assessing aviation safety culture is vital in reducing mishaps.  
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USCG Hazard Reporting Limitations 
Hazreps were extracted from Class D mishaps if the mishap cost less than 500 
dollars and sustained zero injuries. 500 dollars seemed like a reasonable threshold for 
USCG aviation safety leadership (C. Wright, J. Cooley, personal communications, 
January 2, 2018), however, it is an arbitrary threshold. Perhaps, some hazreps cost more 
than 500 dollars but were rich with learned-lessons. This would result in missing data that 
was in the spirit of the research question. On the contrary, there may have been mishaps 
that cost less than 500 dollars that were comparatively pedestrian. Ideally, there would be 
a separation between Class D mishaps and hazreps. Class D mishaps could be kept within 
the criteria similar to Class A, B, and C, namely, severity of injuries, cost, and damage. 
Hazreps, on the other hand, could be comprised of voluntarily-reported items or learned 
lessons. Hazreps could then better “reveal hazardous trends and underscore lessons 
learned…” and get “reported to prevent recurrence of similar events that could result in 
much greater injury or damage” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1311), 2016, p. 3-
4). If hazreps were separate from mishap classification, research such as this would 
reveal trends with more distinction.  
 Presently, there is no method for Flight Safety Officers to track hazard reports 
unless they meet Class D mishap criteria. If there were a means of tracking those hazards 
that got reported by verbal means, via the anonymous hazreps link on the flight schedule, 
or via the Anymouse (suggestion) box, hazrep data would be enriched with quantity and 
quality because bureaucratic barriers associated with formal Class D hazard reports 
would not exist.  
 
 
50 
5. How can the safety survey be improved? 
Design and Planning 
When drafting survey items, the point of continual reference should be research 
questions. Research questions should exist to help the survey owners retain focus on what 
it is they are trying to measure (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). It is unknown if the U.S. 
Coast Guard Office of Aviation Safety developed research questions during the survey 
design phase. The survey, however, covers the topics of aviation safety, motor vehicle 
safety, and recreational safety which adds to the survey’s complexity, length, and 
confusion, all of which, degrade the validity of the survey as a whole (Blair, Czaja, & 
Blair, 2014). 
Pre-Testing 
Pre-testing is the process of verifying that respondents comprehend, understand, 
and are willing to answer survey items. This step is important to survey quality in order 
to make necessary edits and to reveal concealed ambiguity before the survey is in use. 
Response error is attributed to a lack of pre-testing and may affect response rates and 
response quality (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). It is unknown if the USCG pre-tested the 
current safety survey. If pre-testing has not occurred, the survey could be improved by 
conducting pre-test processes.  
Survey Item Sequence 
 When the order of items is carefully considered, survey validity and reliability is 
improved (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Blair, Czaja, & Blair (2014) suggest placing 
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survey items relevant to the survey’s purpose early on. Doing so helps the respondent get 
into the mindset of the survey’s topic while garnering interest in the survey. Then, while 
respondents are still engaged, the most important and challenging questions should be 
next (Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). In the USCG survey, demographics are the first 
string of survey items.  
The most sensitive survey items should be toward the end of the survey, after 
rapport has been established and the respondent feels more comfortable (Krosnick & 
Presser, 2010; Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). Lastly, similarly-themed survey items 
should be grouped together in the survey. This makes the survey cognitively easier for 
respondents. (Krosnick & Presser, 2010).  
In review of the safety survey, there does not appear to be much grouping of 
similarly-themed items nor are there more (or less) sensitive items toward the survey’s 
end. It appears as though more consideration should be applied to the USCG’s survey 
item sequence.  
Survey Item Quality 
 The wording of survey items affects the quality of the survey as a whole (Blair, 
Czaja, & Blair, 2010). Web surveys, in particular, should be clear because there is no 
interviewer or proctor to consult if the respondent has a clarification question. This clarity 
directly affects a survey’s success (Wald, Gray, Eatough, 2018). Blair, Czaja, & Blair 
(2010) cite the following obstacles which degrade a respondent’s ability to answer survey 
items: “Verbose, too many conditions, ambiguous wording, combining two questions into 
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one, asking respondents to distinguish between subtleties, having categories that overlap 
(Don’t know & N/A and 0=did not answer & actually not answering)” (p. 176). The 
USCG safety survey contains items that present all of these obstacles.  
Blair, Czaja, & Blair (2010) also suggest that specific terminology may not be 
understood by all survey respondents. The safety survey contains jargon that may be 
understood by many respondents, but perhaps not understood by all, especially those 
respondents new to their positions and who lack experience. For instance, the first 
question (after basic demographics) states, “1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT 
policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for the job I do” (USCG Office of Aviation 
Safety (CG-1131), 2018). Respondents may not know that ORGMAN is the acronym for 
Organization Manual or what that manual’s purpose is. Similarly, new pilots may not 
know what MPCs (maintenance procedure cards) are because pilots do not use MPCs and 
new pilots may lack the on-the-job experience to have learned about MPCs.  
 Shadish, Cook, & Campbell (2002) suggest direct, simple wording in survey 
items. In fact, each item’s wording should be tightly connected with a survey’s research 
question (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). Addressing multiple research questions, or the use 
of double-barreled items, contribute to ambiguity over what interpretation is intended and 
therefore degrades the quality of that survey items’ validity (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014; 
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). An example of this is, and one that is quite 
applicable to this research is, “21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting 
safety violations, unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without 
fear of reprisal” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018). It is unclear if the 
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survey item is emphasizing the encouragement of hazard reporting or emphasizing a lack 
of fear of reprisal. Furthermore, survey analysts will not know what underlying 
dimension the respondent was addressing when there are more than one dimensions 
included in a singular survey item (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014).   
 Another obstacle in addressing survey items involves including too many 
conditions per survey item (Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). An example from the USCG’s 
survey is, “10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to obtain 
sufficient rest to perform their jobs” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018). 
This item includes three conditions, which in turn, limit the respondents’ ability to 
address this item if, for instance, the respondent’s rest is affected by other conditions not 
mentioned here. There is more ambiguity in this item in that job performance may indeed 
be affected by lifestyle, behavior, and judgement, but perhaps, not via rest. Ambiguity is 
yet another obstacle that affects respondents’ ability to address survey items (Blair, 
Czaja, & Blair, 2014).  
 Loaded questions (items) should be avoided. These arrive in different forms 
(Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014) and plague the USCG safety survey. Even though many 
items’ response scale is on an agree/disagree continuum, some survey items are still 
asking yes/no-type responses. For example, “31. My unit has sufficient experienced 
personnel to operate safely” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018) elicits a 
yes/no opinion and therefore, a bias towards yea-saying will impact this survey data 
(Blair, Czaja, & Blair, 2014). Alternatively, this survey item could be reworded and offer 
a continuum of experience, or safety, for instance. 
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 Krosnick (1999) recommends that item scales should be divided evenly along the 
response-continuum. All of the survey items used in this research contained an odd 
number of sustentative responses, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, 
including “3 = neutral.” Additionally, the safety survey used a “Don’t know” and an 
“N/A” option. All of these options may reduce survey reliability and validity because 
those responses introduce bias associated with neutral answers (Krosnick, 1999). 
Including such responses should be carefully and specifically considered for each survey 
item, as opposed to the blanket decision to include such responses for all survey items 
(Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014). Lastly, the agree-disagree response format injects bias into the 
responses and does not perform as well as item-specific response types (Saris, Revilla, 
Krosnick, Shaeffer, 2010). The USCG uses agree-disagree responses for the majority of 
the survey.  
Survey Revision vs. Historical Data Analysis 
Enacting these suggested amendments to the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety survey, 
there is a risk of losing historical analytical power. With years of survey data, analyzing 
trends over many years may become restricted if the safety survey sustains a complete 
overhaul. Survey items, however, may still maintain measurement objectives through 
careful revision (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014). Perhaps the greater gain involves losing 
historical trend analysis potential in the way of having a new survey which accurately 
measures U.S. Coast Guard safety practitioners’ research needs.  If the safety survey gets 
revised, it is widely suggested that survey authors should use survey items from 
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validated, reliable, pre-tested, existing surveys (Blair, Czaja, Blair, 2014; Krosnick & 
Presser, 2010; Wald, Gray, & Eatough, 2018). 
Hypotheses 
H1: USCG safety survey items that relate to safety culture all load onto one EFA factor. 
H1 was hypothesized because safety culture is one of many topics addressed in the 
USCG safety survey. Furthermore, the safety survey contains items that seemingly relate 
to elements of safety culture (i.e., survey item 21., “Leaders/supervisors in my unit 
encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous 
conditions without fear of reprisal,” (USCG Office of Aviation Safety (CG-1131), 2018) 
which addresses the reporting and just cultures). However, after each iteration of factor 
analysis, safety culture survey items did not necessarily cluster together, nor remain 
within the same factor. The first PAF somewhat resembled this hypothesis, however. 
Specifically, factor 5 had the following survey items cluster together: 
22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and adhering to standards. 
20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life. 
24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes. 
25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations. 
23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the job done. 
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe 
behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear of reprisal. 
26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and management of the 
safety program. 
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14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems or 
illness. 
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by leadership, regardless 
of outcome. 
2. My Command effectively applies risk management (RM) principles and makes prudent 
risk vs. gain decisions. 
11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are addressed  
 
These items are related leadership, which is closely tied to safety culture. 
However, there are other safety-culture-related items that clustered onto other factors, 
such as the following items: 
5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit. 
6. Effective communication flow exists with external units. 
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and incentives. 
18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in my unit. 
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting safety at my unit. 
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit. 
 
Lastly, after the final PAF iteration, no items relating to safety culture remained. 
For instance, the entire list of factor 5 (first PAF) items involving leadership had been 
extracted. To address H1, the final PAF iteration did not have safety culture survey items 
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load onto one EFA factor because there were no longer any survey items related to safety 
culture left remaining.  
 
H2: The safety survey is reliable. 
 As addressed in the results section and research question 4 above, the safety 
survey is considered reliable. 
 
H3: The safety survey correlates with hazreps. 
 The safety survey does not have a statistically significant correlation with hazreps. 
This holds true after analyzing the survey with the first and final PAF.  
The normal distribution of hazreps (Figure 5) implies that using Class D mishaps 
that cost less than 500 dollars with zero injuries is a reasonable way of obtaining hazreps 
to use as the outcome variable for follow-on research. If hazreps were documented every 
time they were submitted via other, none Class D mishap means, however, (verbally, via 
the flight schedule hazrep link, using the Anymouse box), then hazrep data would be 
denser with quality and quantity. 
If this research were repeated, a correlation between the safety survey and hazreps 
may be uncovered if both the survey and hazrep data were improved.  
 
H4: The safety survey predicts hazreps. 
 Based on this research, methodology, and analysis, the safety survey is not 
predictive of the extent to which hazards are reported.  
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Follow-On Research After Safety Survey and Hazrep Improvement 
Through the course of analyzing the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety survey and the 
means by which hazards are documented, it is clear that the outcome of this research 
could have different results if the survey were upgraded and if hazreps were documented 
beyond the use of Class D mishap classification. Even if the methodology of this research 
were kept the same, the correlation and regression outcomes may be different than these 
results. As it presently stands, the safety survey is not compliant with colloquial standards 
for questionnaires. It is therefore recommended that the safety survey be reworded, pre-
tested, and validated. In so doing, USCG leaders may glean answers to their own research 
questions, including those about safety culture, from the survey results. With those 
results, this research could be repeated to determine if the survey is predictive of other 
leading indicators of the health of a safety management system. In turn, this provides 
leaders the opportunity to leverage the survey as a proactive tool.  
This Research at the Individual-Level 
There is additional potential to capitalize on the current safety data setup. The 
data’s potency could increase by a factor of 96.5. The thought involves each air station 
member being assigned an identification code, as is the case each year when the safety 
survey is administered. If that user ID could be associated with an individual during that 
member’s entire tenure at an air station (3 to 4 years), this research could stay at the 
individual-level as opposed to analyzing the correlation/regression data at the air station-
level. In other words, the survey data would not even have to be reduced to factors, but 
instead, remain in its raw form. Instead of factors, the study could use individuals’ survey 
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item responses as the independent variable. As for the outcome variable, safety managers 
would have data associated with individuals’ hazard reports. Using the user ID, this 
research could be repeated associating individual safety survey responses to the quantity 
of hazards reported by each individual. With this current research, the number of lines of 
data was 110. Meanwhile, survey responses totaled 10,622 for the last four years. 
Keeping the data at the individual level rather than the air station level would increase the 
data granularity by a factor of 96.5 (10,622 / 110).  
This idea of associating an individual with a user ID to track their hazard reports 
adds complexity to assuring anonymity. Based on research about the interaction between 
just and reporting cultures, air station cultures would need to make its members truly feel 
safe to report hazards without concern of reprisal. As the literature suggests, this is a 
timely and exhaustive endeavor.  
Conclusion 
 The U.S. Coast Guard safety survey does not predict the extent to which aviation 
hazards are reported, nor is the relationship correlated. The premise that prompted USCG 
aviation safety practitioners to probe into this topic is sound and the results of this 
research may differ with improved means of measuring the U.S. Coast Guard’s aviation 
safety data. 
In recent years, several academic articles documenting and accounting for barriers 
to reporting cultures have been published (Cooper et al., 2019; McMurtrie & 
Molesworth, 2018; Vrbnjak, Denieffe, O’Gorman, & Pajnkihar, 2016). Other works have 
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also been published documenting the importance of assessing safety culture (Reason, 
2008; Stolzer & Goglia, 2015; Wiegmann et al., 2004). There still exists a gap that 
directly ties the elements of safety culture evaluation with proactive means of assessing 
safety management systems at large, such as hazard reporting.  
Possible implications for research and policies based on this study are for other 
studies to be performed using this methodology as a template in an effort to help safety 
managers know if their safety metrics are effective at measuring what is intended. A 
limitation for future studies is the researcher’s access to aviation organizations that 
conduct safety surveys and document hazard reports (or are willing to do so). 
Overcoming this limitation, safety practitioners have the potential to gain insight into the 
state of their organization’s safety culture, and ultimately, suppress mishaps.
Running head: UNITED STATES COAST GUARD SAFETY SURVEY VALIDATION AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
  
APPENDIX A 
List of Survey Questions 
Rank. 
    E1 to E3 
    E4 to E6 
    E7 to W4 
    O1 to O3 
    O4 to O6 
    Civilian 
    Other 
 
Current Job (choose one) 
    Aviation - Rotary-wing Pilot, Aircrew, or AMS 
    Aviation - Fixed-wing Pilot, Aircrew, or AMS 
    Aviation - Support (non-aircrew) 
    Ops Afloat - WMSL/WMEC/WHEC 
    Ops Afloat - PB/FRC 
    Ops Afloat - ATON/Icebreakers 
    Ops Ashore - Boat Station 
    Ops Ashore - Response 
    Ops Ashore - Prevention 
    Ops Ashore - ATON 
    Ops Ashore - Logistics 
    Ops Ashore - General/Other 
    DSF - PSU 
    DSF - MSRT 
    DSF - TACLET  
    DSF - MSST 
    DSF - NSF  
    DSF - Dive Locker 
  
 
Which of the following assets/platforms are you assigned to perform your 
operational duties? (If none, you may skip this question.) 
    H-60 
    H-65 
    C-130 
    C-144 
    C-27 
    C-37 
    Patrol Boat 
    Buoy Tender/Construction Tender/Tugs 
    WMEC/WMSL/WHEC/WPC 
    Icebreaker 
    MLB/UTB/RB-M 
    ATON 
    PSU/SPC-type 
    Other boat 
 
How long have you been assigned to your current unit? 
    0-6 months 
    7-24 months 
    more than 2 years 
 
Have you recently returned from a unit deployment? (choose one) 
    Within last 30 days 
    Within last 1-2 months 
    Within last 3-6 months 
    Within last 7-24 months 
    I am currently deployed 
    N/a; My current job doesn’t require deployments 
  
 
1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined 
for the job I do. 
    Strongly agree - Strongly disagree 
    Don’t know 
    N/a 
 
2. Unit members, from the top down, incorporate risk management (RM) 
principles/processes into decision-making for all activities. 
 
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and incentives. 
 
4. Our unit trains its personnel to safely conduct their jobs.  
 
5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit. 
 
6. Effective communication flow exists with external units. 
 
7. My unit adequately trains our personnel to perform their primary (specialty) 
jobs/duties. 
 
8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I am confident I would 
know what to do in the event of an emergency (e.g., aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, 
adverse weather, etc.). 
 
    What type of drill(s) would benefit you the most? 
   _______________________________________________________________ 
 
9. I was encouraged to take this survey. 
    Yes 
    No 
  
 
10. My unit has a reputation for high-quality performance. 
 
11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are 
addressed. 
 
12. I am able to perform my job without distractions. 
 
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit. 
 
14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems 
or illness. 
 
15. Morale in my unit is high. 
 If you agree, what does your unit do well to promote morale? If you disagree, 
how would you improve morale? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Personnel/crews work effectively as a team. 
 
17. On a scale of 1 to 10, rate the unit's overall safety posture (1-Disastrous - 10 
Completely safe). 
    1 – Disastrous 
    10 – Completely safe 
    N/a 
 
18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in my unit. 
 
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by leadership, 
regardless of outcome. 
 
  
20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life. 
 
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations, unsafe 
behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear of reprisal. 
 
22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and adhering to 
standards. 
 
23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the job done. 
 
24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes. 
 
25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations. 
 
26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and management 
of the safety program. 
 
27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) required 
for the tools and chemicals with which I work (to include eye, ear, hand and foot 
protection as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).* 
 
    If not, what PPE are you lacking? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
    
28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the same quality as our work 
performance when at home base. 
 
29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my unit. 
 
    If additional duties do affect safety, please explain. 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 
  
30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget and equipment) 
to accomplish my job. 
 
31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate safely. 
 
32. Over the past year, I believe the mishap potential at this unit has: 
    Increased 
    Stayed the same 
    Decreased 
    Don’t know; new to unit 
 
     If you selected "increased", why did mishap potential increase? 
 
     If you selected "decreased", why did mishap potential decrease? 
    
33. What safety-related area does your unit excel at? 
    
Off-duty Safety Programs 
 
34. Which of the following activities do you engage in while driving? 
    Phone calls, no hands free 
    Phone calls- with hands free 
    Texting 
    Emailing 
    Eating 
    Other PDA use 
    None of the above 
 
35. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding motorcycle 
safety. 
 
  
36. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding private motor 
vehicle (PMV/POV) safety. 
 
37. My supervisor assists me in identifying and reducing risks associated with 
PMV/POV travel. 
 
38. Our leaders do a good job communicating policies regarding drinking and 
driving. 
 
39. I do not drive fatigued. 
 
40. My unit ensures that personnel are made aware of local area hazards for off-
duty activities.  
 
41. My unit's off-duty and recreational activity program led by the unit safety 
coordinator (or ground safety officer) is working well to reduce injuries. 
 
42. The most significant action(s) my Commanding Officer, OIC, or Team Leader 
can take to improve safety is/are: 
    
43. If you were the Commanding Officer/OIC, what safety issues would you 
make it a priority to address? (Choose up to three). 
    Crew training       Maintenance tempo     Operations tempo      
Personnel shortages 
    Standardization   Risk management     Crew fatigue   
Caring for crews 
    Non-punitive reporting culture      Hazmat and/or chemical hazards 
    Mishap preparedness        Safety communications 
    Crew experience level     Other 
 
 
(Operations-only questions) 
 
  
1. Stan/evals* are conducted as intended, to honestly assess crew qualifications, 
standardization and proficiency. (*Terminology varies by community: includes 
SEOPS/TSTA, RFO, STAN checkrides, workups, DORA, etc.) 
 
2. Personnel must possess the appropriate experience and skills to earn 
designations/qualifications in my unit. 
 
3. The awareness of unit crews regarding familiarity with local area operational 
hazards (e.g., navigational hazards, terrain, towers, traffic patterns, fuel 
availability) is adequate to support safe and standard operations. 
 
4. Crew rest policies are enforced at my unit. 
    Strongly agree 
    Strongly disagree 
    I’m not familiar with our crew rest policies 
 
5. Crew Endurance Management is a factor in our day-to-day operations and the 
principles are followed. 
    Strongly agree 
    Strongly disagree 
    I’m not familiar with crew endurance management. 
 
6. Violations of required operating procedures or other local/unit regulations are 
rare in my unit. 
 
7. The stan/evaluation personnel at my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA and RFO) 
are well-respected. 
 
8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting is rarely postponed or 
cancelled. 
 
9. Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest to 
perform their jobs. 
  
 
10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to obtain 
sufficient rest to perform their jobs. 
 
11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my missions. 
 
12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational proficiency. 
 
13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal protective equipment I 
wear while conducting missions (e.g., helmets, survival vests, etc.). 
 
14. My asset/platform(s) is/are capable of safely accomplishing the missions 
assigned to it/them. 
 
  How can your unit increase proficiency and/or currency? 
 
  In what area(s) does the unit lack proficiency and why? 
    
15. In your opinion, what will be some of the causal factors leading to the unit's 
next serious on-duty mishap (Class A or B mishap)? (choose up to three) 
    Crew inattention/complacency     Poor weather (including low visibility 
conditions) 
    Mechanical failure     Fatigue     Congested operating areas (e.g., 
collision hazards) 
    Inadequate/insufficient training    Maintenance error     Rushing 
    Towing or ground equipment operations    Refueling / servicing / 
HAZMAT 
    Poorly-designed (or lack of) procedures     A hazard we aren't aware of yet 
    Automation mismanagement     Poor awareness of local hazards in 
operational environment 
    Inexperience     Physiological (nausea, disorientation, hypoxia)     
Other 
 
  
16. (Aviation-only) The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping 
to improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety.  
 
17. (Afloat/Ashore-only) The Team Coordination Training (TCT) program is 
helping to improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety. 
 
 
(Maintenance/repair personnel only) 
 
1. Maintenance activities are accurately documented at my unit. 
 
2. My unit effectively communicates pertinent maintenance information during 
shift changes, duty section changes, and watch reliefs (as applicable). 
 
3. Tool control is closely monitored. 
 
4. Maintainers in my unit must possess the appropriate experience and skills to 
earn qualifications. 
 
5. Anyone intentionally violating maintenance procedures (MPC or other written 
technical guidance) is swiftly corrected. 
 
    Comments on MPC/technical procedures violations: 
    
6. Maintainers in my unit are given adequate training opportunities (C-schools) to 
develop their skills. 
 
7. Maintainers work effectively as a team. 
 
8. Quality Assurance (QA) is well-respected at my unit. 
 
9. Leaders/supervisors in my unit emphasize safe maintenance in achieving 
operational readiness/availability goals. 
  
 
10. Parts are sufficiently available to meet maintenance demands. 
 
    Comments on parts availability: 
   
11. Required tools and equipment are serviceable and used at my unit. 
 
    Comments on tool quality. 
    
12. Required publications are current and used in my unit. 
 
13. My maintenance crew/team/shift is sufficiently staffed for its workload. 
  Comments on staffing. 
 
14. (Aviation-only) My unit's Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
program is helping to improve maintenance performance, coordination, and 
safety. 
 
 
(Pilots and coxswains only) 
 
1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear discrepancies with 
maintenance/engineering authorities before and after missions. 
 
2. My Command (or team leader) effectively applies risk management (RM) 
principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions. 
 
3. The Sector/District/Area (or other TACON) providing my mission tasking 
effectively applies RM principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions. 
 
4. My unit closely monitors currency standards. 
 
  
5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and operating procedures. 
 
6. I know and understand the operational expectations set forth by unit leaders 
(CO, OIC, OPS, Team Leaders, etc.). 
 
7. My unit provides me with sufficient training hours per month to operate safely. 
 
8. My unit has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks. 
 
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) are effective at promoting safety at my unit. 
 
10.  My unit closely monitors proficiency in flight and mission planning. 
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Appendix C 
Factor and Reliability Analysis– All Survey Items Except Q6 and Q7 
The following is a list of the clustered items for the seven factors encapsulated in the first 
iteration of Principle Axis Factoring.  
Factor 1: Skills/standardization evaluations 
Factor 2: Resources 
Factor 3: Crew rest/workday  
Factor 4: Standards monitoring 
Factor 5: Leadership and safety  
Factor 6: Unit safety adoption  
Factor 7: Safety Officer and promotion 
 
Table C1. Factor and Reliability Analysis– All Survey Items Except Q6 and Q7 
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Stan/evals* are 
conducted as intended, to 
honestly assess crew 
qualifications, 
standardization and 
proficiency. 
(*Terminology varies by 
community.) 
0.539             
  
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The awareness of unit 
crews regarding familiarity 
with local area operational 
hazards (e.g., navigational 
hazards, terrain, towers, 
traffic patterns, fuel 
availability) is adequate to 
support safe and standard 
operations. 
0.501             
2. Personnel must possess 
the appropriate experience 
and skills to earn 
designations/qualifications 
in my unit. 
0.495             
14. My asset is capable of 
safely accomplishing the 
missions assigned to it. 
0.478             
13. I am satisfied with the 
quality and fit of the 
personal protective 
equipment I wear while 
conducting missions (e.g., 
helmets, survival vests, 
etc.). 
0.428             
7. The stan/evaluation 
personnel at my unit (to 
include SEOPS, TSTA and 
RFO) are well-respected. 
0.426             
16. The Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) 
program is helping to 
improve mission 
performance, crew 
coordination, and safety. 
0.329             
30. I am provided adequate 
resources (e.g., time, 
staffing, budget and 
equipment) to accomplish 
my job. 
  0.505           
8. My unit has sufficient 
manning/assets to perform 
its current tasks. 
  0.501           
  
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. Additional duties do 
not adversely affect safety 
in my unit. 
  0.474           
12. I am able to perform 
my job without 
distractions. 
  0.425           
31. My unit has sufficient 
experienced personnel to 
operate safely. 
  0.363           
12. Crews at my unit are 
able to maintain 
operational proficiency. 
  0.354           
9. Our unit's operational 
demands allow members to 
obtain sufficient rest to 
perform their jobs. 
    0.781         
4. Crew rest policies are 
enforced at my unit. 
    0.740         
5. Crew Endurance 
Management is a factor in 
our day-to-day operations 
and the principles are 
followed. 
    0.740         
10. Our unit members' life 
style, behavior, and 
judgment allow them to 
obtain sufficient rest to 
perform their jobs. 
    0.535         
6. Violations of required 
operating procedures or 
other applicable local/unit 
regulations are rare in my 
unit. 
    0.452         
11. I have adequate time to 
prepare for and brief my 
missions. 
    0.358         
10. My unit closely 
monitors proficiency in 
flight and mission 
planning. 
      0.690       
4. My unit closely monitors 
currency standards. 
      0.617       
  
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My unit adequately 
reviews and updates 
standards and operating 
procedures. 
      0.460       
22. Leaders/supervisors set 
a good example for 
following rules and 
adhering to standards. 
        -0.799     
20. Leaders/supervisors in 
my unit care about 
members' quality of life. 
        -0.764     
24. Leaders/Supervisors in 
my unit react well to 
unexpected changes. 
        -0.762     
25. Leaders trust 
subordinates to manage 
routine operations. 
        -0.707     
23. Leaders/Supervisors in 
my unit discourage cutting 
corners to get the job done. 
        -0.648     
21. Leaders/supervisors in 
my unit encourage 
reporting safety violations, 
unsafe behaviors, near-
miss events, or hazardous 
conditions without fear of 
reprisal. 
        -0.643     
26. Leaders/supervisors are 
actively engaged in the 
promotion and 
management of the safety 
program. 
        -0.569     
14. Individuals are 
comfortable approaching 
supervisors about personal 
problems or illness. 
        -0.500     
19. Safety-
conscious decision-making 
is positively recognized by 
leadership, regardless of 
outcome. 
        -0.381     
  
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My Command 
effectively applies risk 
management (RM) 
principles and makes 
prudent risk vs. gain 
decisions. 
        -0.355     
11. I have the authority to 
halt unsafe activities until 
the hazards/risks are 
addressed. 
        -0.315     
4. Our unit trains its 
personnel to safely conduct 
their jobs. 
          -
0.591 
  
2. Unit members, from the 
top down, incorporate risk 
management (RM) 
principles/processes into 
decision-making for all 
activities. 
          -
0.528 
  
7. My unit adequately 
trains our personnel to 
perform their primary 
(specialty) jobs/duties. 
          -
0.526 
  
1. Standards (unit 
ORGMAN, COMDT 
policies, MPCs, etc.) are 
clearly defined for the job I 
do. 
          -
0.508 
  
5. Effective 
communication flow exists 
within my unit. 
          -
0.488 
  
6. Effective 
communication flow 
exists with external units. 
          -
0.411 
  
8. The frequency and 
quality of unit drills is 
sufficient that I am 
confident I would know 
what to do in the event of 
an emergency (e.g., 
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, 
adverse weather, etc.). 
          -
0.404 
  
  
Table C1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My unit recognizes 
individual safety acts 
through awards and 
incentives. 
          -
0.370 
0.341 
10. My unit has a 
reputation for high-quality 
performance. 
          -
0.369 
  
18. The Safety 
Officer/Safety Manager 
position is a desirable 
position in my unit. 
            0.508 
9. The unit Safety 
Officer(s) is/are effective at 
promoting safety at my 
unit. 
      0.389     0.440 
13. Safety stand downs are 
effective in my unit. 
            0.342 
Eigenvalues 21.54 2.13 1.79 1.35 1.21 1.08 1.01 
Percent of Variance 42.23 4.18 3.50 2.65 2.37 2.11 1.97 
D .86 .80 .89 .80 .92 .89 .66 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Factor 1: Skills/standardization evaluations 
Factor 2: Resources 
Factor 3: Crew rest/workday  
Factor 4: Standards monitoring 
Factor 5: Leadership and safety  
Factor 6: Unit safety adoption  
Factor 7: Safety Officer and promotion
  
Appendix D 
Factor and Reliability Analysis – Final PAF Survey Item Extraction Adherence 
The following is a list of the clustered items for the three factors encapsulated in the 
fourth iteration of Principle Axis Factoring.  
Factor 1 represented several topics including training quality, FSO perception, Crew 
Resource Management, standardization, and protective equipment.  
Factor 2 represented resources, namely time and experience.  
Factor 3 represented asset reliability and satisfaction with protective equipment 
 
Table D1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting 
safety at my unit. 
0.719     
3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards 
and incentives. 
0.653     
19. Safety-conscious decision-making is 
positively recognized by leadership, regardless of outcome. 
0.631     
1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear 
discrepancies with maintenance/engineering authorities 
before and after missions. 
0.603     
13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit. 0.565     
5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and 
operating procedures. 
0.551     
16. The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is 
helping to improve mission performance, crew 
coordination, and safety. 
0.512     
1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs, 
etc.) are clearly defined for the job I do. 
0.470     
  
 
Table D1. 
Survey Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 
8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I 
am confident I would know what to do in the event of an 
emergency (e.g., aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse 
weather, etc.). 
0.426     
28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the 
same quality as our work performance when at home base. 
0.406     
27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) required for the tools and chemicals with 
which I work (to include eye, ear, hand and foot protection 
as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).* 
0.357     
30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, 
budget and equipment) to accomplish my job. 
  0.722   
12. I am able to perform my job without distractions.   0.662   
29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my 
unit. 
  0.631   
31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate 
safely. 
  0.537   
8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting 
is rarely postponed or cancelled. 
  0.370   
14. My asset is capable of safely accomplishing the 
missions assigned to it. 
    0.530 
13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal 
protective equipment I wear while conducting missions 
(e.g., helmets, survival vests, etc.). 
    0.479 
11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my 
missions. 
  0.355 0.385 
12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational 
proficiency. 
  0.328 0.330 
Eigenvalue 7.90 1.31 1.06 
Percent of Variance 39.49 6.54 5.28 
D .87 .79 .59 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
  
 
Appendix E 
First PAF Iteration – Close Factor Loading 
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
1. Standards (unit 
ORGMAN, COMDT policies, 
MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for 
the job I do. 
1.8607 0.77004 10622 99 
2. Unit members, from the top 
down, incorporate risk 
management (RM) 
principles/processes into decision-
making for all activities. 
1.8083 0.73444 10531 190 
3. My unit recognizes individual 
safety acts through awards and 
incentives. 
2.0882 0.92949 10385 336 
4. Our unit trains its personnel to 
safely conduct their jobs. 
1.8407 0.71320 10575 146 
5. Effective communication flow 
exists within my unit. 
2.3004 1.00099 10496 225 
6. Effective communication flow 
exists with external units. 
2.3816 0.89955 9600 1121 
7. My unit adequately trains our 
personnel to perform their primary 
(specialty) jobs/duties. 
1.9797 0.80184 10552 169 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
8. The frequency and quality of 
unit drills is sufficient that I am 
confident I would know what to do 
in the event of an emergency (e.g., 
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, 
adverse weather, etc.). 
2.1636 0.86291 10456 265 
10. My unit has a reputation for 
high-quality performance. 
1.6678 0.71274 10472 249 
11. I have the authority to halt 
unsafe activities until the 
hazards/risks are addressed. 
1.5918 0.70268 10589 132 
12. I am able to perform my job 
without distractions. 
2.4378 1.05076 10617 104 
13. Safety stand downs are 
effective in my unit. 
2.1047 0.84821 9890 831 
14. Individuals are comfortable 
approaching supervisors about 
personal problems or illness. 
1.8576 0.78534 10506 215 
18. The Safety Officer/Safety 
Manager position is a desirable 
position in my unit. 
2.4805 0.82473 9473 1248 
19. Safety-conscious decision-
making is positively recognized by 
leadership, regardless of outcome. 
2.0062 0.77918 10341 380 
20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit 
care about members' quality of 
life. 
1.8764 0.83934 10532 189 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit 
encourage reporting safety 
violations, unsafe behaviors, near-
miss events, or hazardous 
conditions without fear of reprisal. 
1.7902 0.72453 10504 217 
22. Leaders/supervisors set a good 
example for following rules and 
adhering to standards. 
1.9147 0.77605 10519 202 
23. Leaders/Supervisors in my 
unit discourage cutting corners to 
get the job done. 
1.8494 0.80645 10495 226 
24. Leaders/Supervisors in my 
unit react well to unexpected 
changes. 
2.0634 0.84482 10470 251 
25. Leaders trust subordinates to 
manage routine operations. 
2.0585 0.88583 10549 172 
26. Leaders/supervisors are 
actively engaged in the promotion 
and management of the safety 
program. 
1.9794 0.70199 10319 402 
27. I have easy access to all of the 
Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) required for the tools and 
chemicals with which I work (to 
include eye, ear, hand and foot 
protection as well as a current 
MSDS for chemicals).* 
1.8524 0.77387 10287 434 
16. Personnel/crews work 
effectively as a team. 
1.8138 0.64390 10569 152 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
28. My unit's work performance 
when deployed is of the same 
quality as our work performance 
when at home base. 
1.9318 0.73220 7703 3018 
29. Additional duties do not 
adversely affect safety in my unit. 
2.4127 0.93705 10085 636 
30. I am provided adequate 
resources (e.g., time, staffing, 
budget and equipment) to 
accomplish my job. 
2.5709 1.09495 10570 151 
31. My unit has sufficient 
experienced personnel to operate 
safely. 
2.2473 0.94334 10505 216 
1. Stan/evals* are conducted as 
intended, to honestly assess crew 
qualifications, standardization and 
proficiency. (*Terminology varies 
by community.) 
1.7590 0.67173 6606 4115 
2. Personnel must possess the 
appropriate experience and skills 
to earn designations/qualifications 
in my unit. 
1.7623 0.69107 6777 3944 
3. The awareness of unit crews 
regarding familiarity with local 
area operational hazards (e.g., 
navigational hazards, terrain, 
towers, traffic patterns, fuel 
availability) is adequate to support 
safe and standard operations. 
1.7778 0.61886 6720 4001 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
4. Crew rest policies are enforced 
at my unit. 
1.9092 0.81161 6763 3958 
5. Crew Endurance Management is 
a factor in our day-to-day 
operations and the principles are 
followed. 
2.0101 0.80228 6317 4404 
6. Violations of required operating 
procedures or other applicable 
local/unit regulations are rare in 
my unit. 
1.9202 0.69775 6426 4295 
7. The stan/evaluation personnel at 
my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA 
and RFO) are well-respected. 
1.8037 0.67397 6519 4202 
8. Mission-related training 
conducted in a classroom setting is 
rarely postponed or cancelled. 
2.3317 0.93837 6288 4433 
9. Our unit's operational demands 
allow members to obtain sufficient 
rest to perform their jobs. 
2.2097 0.84344 6738 3983 
10. Our unit members' life style, 
behavior, and judgment allow 
them to obtain sufficient rest to 
perform their jobs. 
2.0257 0.67553 6502 4219 
11. I have adequate time to prepare 
for and brief my missions. 
1.9978 0.69877 6700 4021 
12. Crews at my unit are able to 
maintain operational proficiency. 
2.1274 0.81904 6734 3987 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
13. I am satisfied with the quality 
and fit of the personal protective 
equipment I wear while 
conducting missions (e.g., helmets, 
survival vests, etc.). 
1.9600 0.80479 6733 3988 
14. My asset is capable of safely 
accomplishing the missions 
assigned to it. 
1.9071 0.74653 6774 3947 
16. The Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) program is 
helping to improve mission 
performance, crew coordination, 
and safety. 
1.8673 0.66990 5072 5649 
1. Crews are provided clear 
processes to address asset/gear 
discrepancies with 
maintenance/engineering 
authorities before and after 
missions. 
1.6081 0.61028 2493 8228 
2. My Command effectively 
applies risk management (RM) 
principles and makes prudent risk 
vs. gain decisions. 
1.5799 0.62900 2502 8219 
3. The Sector/District/Area (or 
other TACON) providing my 
mission tasking effectively applies 
RM principles and makes prudent 
risk vs. gain decisions. 
2.5275 1.03767 2307 8414 
4. My unit closely monitors 
currency standards. 
1.6492 0.64553 2500 8221 
  
Table E1. First PAF Iteration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
5. My unit adequately reviews and 
updates standards and operating 
procedures. 
1.7934 0.73776 2478 8243 
6. I know and understand the 
operational expectations set forth 
by unit leaders (CO, OPS, etc.). 
1.6849 0.68919 2510 8211 
7. My unit provides me 
with sufficient training hours per 
month to operate safely. 
2.0647 0.90496 2472 8249 
8. My unit has sufficient 
manning/assets to perform its 
current tasks. 
2.5868 1.12808 2500 8221 
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are 
effective at promoting safety at my 
unit. 
1.7094 0.64132 2498 8223 
10. My unit closely 
monitors proficiency in flight and 
mission planning. 
1.8163 0.73220 2477 8244 
 
 
  
  
Appendix F 
Fourth PAF Iteration – Satisfactory to Proceed to Reliability 
Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
1. Standards (unit 
ORGMAN, COMDT policies, 
MPCs, etc.) are clearly defined for 
the job I do. 
1.8607 0.77004 10622 90 
3. My unit recognizes individual 
safety acts through awards and 
incentives. 
2.0882 0.92949 10385 327 
8. The frequency and quality of unit 
drills is sufficient that I am confident 
I would know what to do in the 
event of an emergency (e.g., 
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse 
weather, etc.). 
2.1636 0.86291 10456 256 
12. I am able to perform my job 
without distractions. 
2.4378 1.05076 10617 95 
13. Safety stand downs are effective 
in my unit. 
2.1047 0.84821 9890 822 
19. Safety-conscious decision-
making is positively recognized by 
leadership, regardless of outcome. 
2.0062 0.77918 10341 371 
  
Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
27. I have easy access to all of the 
Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) required for the tools and 
chemicals with which I work (to 
include eye, ear, hand and foot 
protection as well as a current 
MSDS for chemicals).* 
1.8524 0.77387 10287 425 
28. My unit's work performance 
when deployed is of the same 
quality as our work performance 
when at home base. 
1.9318 0.73220 7703 3009 
29. Additional duties do not 
adversely affect safety in my unit. 
2.4127 0.93705 10085 627 
30. I am provided adequate 
resources (e.g., time, staffing, 
budget and equipment) to 
accomplish my job. 
2.5709 1.09495 10570 142 
31. My unit has sufficient 
experienced personnel to operate 
safely. 
2.2473 0.94334 10505 207 
8. Mission-related training 
conducted in a classroom setting is 
rarely postponed or cancelled. 
2.3317 0.93837 6288 4424 
11. I have adequate time to prepare 
for and brief my missions. 
1.9978 0.69877 6700 4012 
12. Crews at my unit are able to 
maintain operational proficiency. 
2.1274 0.81904 6734 3978 
  
Table F1. Fourth PAF Iteration 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Analysis 
N 
Missing 
N 
13. I am satisfied with the quality 
and fit of the personal protective 
equipment I wear while conducting 
missions (e.g., helmets, survival 
vests, etc.). 
1.9600 0.80479 6733 3979 
14. My asset is capable of safely 
accomplishing the missions assigned 
to it. 
1.9071 0.74653 6774 3938 
16. The Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) program is 
helping to improve mission 
performance, crew coordination, and 
safety. 
1.8673 0.66990 5072 5640 
1. Crews are provided clear 
processes to address asset/gear 
discrepancies with 
maintenance/engineering authorities 
before and after missions. 
1.6081 0.61028 2493 8219 
5. My unit adequately reviews and 
updates standards and operating 
procedures. 
1.7934 0.73776 2478 8234 
9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are 
effective at promoting safety at my 
unit. 
1.7094 0.64132 2498 8214 
 
  
  
Appendix G 
Table G1. List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding 
Q11R 1. Standards (unit ORGMAN, COMDT policies, MPCs, etc.) are clearly 
defined for the job I do. 
Q12R 2. Unit members, from the top down, incorporate risk management (RM) 
principles/processes into decision-making for all activities. 
Q13R 3. My unit recognizes individual safety acts through awards and 
incentives. 
Q14R 4. Our unit trains its personnel to safely conduct their jobs. 
Q15R 5. Effective communication flow exists within my unit. 
Q16R 6. Effective communication flow exists with external units. 
Q17R 7. My unit adequately trains our personnel to perform their primary 
(specialty) jobs/duties. 
Q18R 8. The frequency and quality of unit drills is sufficient that I am confident 
I would know what to do in the event of an emergency (e.g., 
aircraft/vessel mishap, fire, adverse weather, etc.). 
Q21R 10. My unit has a reputation for high-quality performance. 
Q22R 11. I have the authority to halt unsafe activities until the hazards/risks are 
addressed. 
Q23R 12. I am able to perform my job without distractions. 
Q24R 13. Safety stand downs are effective in my unit. 
Q25R 14. Individuals are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal 
problems or illness. 
Q30R 18. The Safety Officer/Safety Manager position is a desirable position in 
my unit. 
Q31R 19. Safety-conscious decision-making is positively recognized by 
leadership, regardless of outcome. 
Q33R 20. Leaders/supervisors in my unit care about members' quality of life. 
Q34R 21. Leaders/supervisors in my unit encourage reporting safety violations, 
unsafe behaviors, near-miss events, or hazardous conditions without fear 
of reprisal. 
Q35R 22. Leaders/supervisors set a good example for following rules and 
adhering to standards. 
Q36R 23. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit discourage cutting corners to get the 
job done. 
Q37R 24. Leaders/Supervisors in my unit react well to unexpected changes. 
Q38R 25. Leaders trust subordinates to manage routine operations. 
Q39R 26. Leaders/supervisors are actively engaged in the promotion and 
management of the safety program. 
  
Table G1. List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding 
Q40R 27. I have easy access to all of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
required for the tools and chemicals with which I work (to include eye, 
ear, hand and foot protection as well as a current MSDS for chemicals).* 
Q28R 16. Personnel/crews work effectively as a team. 
Q42R 28. My unit's work performance when deployed is of the same quality as 
our work performance when at home base. 
Q43R 29. Additional duties do not adversely affect safety in my unit. 
Q45R 30. I am provided adequate resources (e.g., time, staffing, budget and 
equipment) to accomplish my job. 
Q46R 31. My unit has sufficient experienced personnel to operate safely. 
Q65R 1. Stan/evals* are conducted as intended, to honestly assess crew 
qualifications, standardization and proficiency. (*Terminology varies by 
community.) 
Q66R 2. Personnel must possess the appropriate experience and skills to earn 
designations/qualifications in my unit. 
Q67R 3. The awareness of unit crews regarding familiarity with local 
area operational hazards (e.g., navigational hazards, terrain, towers, traffic 
patterns, fuel availability) is adequate to support safe and standard 
operations. 
Q68R 4. Crew rest policies are enforced at my unit. 
Q69R 5. Crew Endurance Management is a factor in our day-to-day operations 
and the principles are followed. 
Q70R 6. Violations of required operating procedures or other applicable 
local/unit regulations are rare in my unit. 
Q71R 7. The stan/evaluation personnel at my unit (to include SEOPS, TSTA and 
RFO) are well-respected. 
Q72R 8. Mission-related training conducted in a classroom setting is rarely 
postponed or cancelled. 
Q73R 9. Our unit's operational demands allow members to obtain sufficient rest 
to perform their jobs. 
Q74R 10. Our unit members' life style, behavior, and judgment allow them to 
obtain sufficient rest to perform their jobs. 
Q75R 11. I have adequate time to prepare for and brief my missions. 
Q76R 12. Crews at my unit are able to maintain operational proficiency. 
Q78R 13. I am satisfied with the quality and fit of the personal protective 
equipment I wear while conducting missions (e.g., helmets, survival vests, 
etc.). 
Q79R 14. My asset is capable of safely accomplishing the missions assigned to 
it. 
Q81R 16. The Crew Resource Management (CRM) program is helping to 
improve mission performance, crew coordination, and safety. 
Q111R 1. Crews are provided clear processes to address asset/gear discrepancies 
with maintenance/engineering authorities before and after missions. 
  
Table G1. List of Survey Items Used for Analysis with USCG-Defined Item Coding 
Q112R 2. My Command effectively applies risk management (RM) principles 
and makes prudent risk vs. gain decisions. 
Q113R 3. The Sector/District/Area (or other TACON) providing my mission 
tasking effectively applies RM principles and makes prudent risk vs. gain 
decisions. 
Q114R 4. My unit closely monitors currency standards. 
Q115R 5. My unit adequately reviews and updates standards and operating 
procedures. 
Q116R 6. I know and understand the operational expectations set forth by unit 
leaders (CO, OPS, etc.). 
Q117R 7. My unit provides me with sufficient training hours per month to operate 
safely. 
Q118R 8. My unit has sufficient manning/assets to perform its current tasks. 
Q119R 9. The unit Safety Officer(s) is/are effective at promoting safety at my 
unit. 
Q129R 10. My unit closely monitors proficiency in flight and mission planning. 
 
  
  
APPENDIX H 
First PAF Factors 1 – 7 Zpred Scatterplot 
 
 
 
  
  
APPENDIX I 
Final PAF Factors 1 – 3 Zpred Scatterplot 
 
  
  
APPENDIX J 
P-P Plot for First PAF 
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